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COUNCIL AND COMMISSION
TWENTY-SECOND REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF lHE MONETARY
CO MMfITEE
FOREWORD
The purpose of this report is to give a brief account of the activities of the Monetary
Committee in 1980.
The Committee held eleven meetings in the course of the year while the Alternates and the
Working Parties set up at its initiative met several times.
At its meeting on 23 January 1980 the Committee elected its officers. Mr. J.- Y. Haberer
Directeur du Tresor, Paris, was elected Chairman, and Sir Kenneth Couzens, HM Treasury,
London, Mr L. Dini, Banca d'ltalia, Rome and Mr M. Horgan, Department of Finance
Dublin were elected Vice-Chairmen. Mr W. Flandorffer, Bundesministerium fur Wirtschaft
Bonn, was appointed Chairman of the Alternates. These officers will end their term of office
on 31 December 1981. The list of members in office during 1980 is annexed.
Starting in November, Greek representatives attended the Committee s meetings as observers.
I. INTRODUCTION
1. The world economy in 1980 was hit by the effects
of the second oil shock. First, the expansion of economic
activity slowed distinctly: world production and trade
growth rates fell sharply. Second, the current account
balance of payments disequilibria of the major country
groupings worsened further: the OPEC (Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries) surplus swelled
considerably; this was matched by a more than twofold
increase in the current payments deficit of all the OECD
(Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development) countries and a sharp rise in the non-oil
developing countries' deficit.
2. The Community s economy was hit head on by
these developments. Growth . slowed, unemployment
spread, inflation increased and the current payments
deficit almost tripled in comparison with 1979 - an
unprecedented development. Not only did the rate of
inflation rise in the Community, but inflation rate
differentials between Community countries widened
further, although towards the end of the year a marked
reduction of the inflation rate, in some countries with
relatively high inflation took place. Unlike the situation
during the first oil crisis, almost all the Community
countries are running current payments deficits. Despite
this un favourable environment, the European Monetary
System worked satisfactorily: no realignment took place
in 1980, the participating currencies all remained within
their fluctuation margins and the observed changes in
relative positions did not threaten the overall stability of
the system.No C 124/2 Official Journal of the European Communities 25. 5. 81
ll. COMMUNITY ACTION AND THE ACTMTIES OF mE COMMIlTEE
3. The Committee began the year by continuing the
work it had started in 1979 on  the evolution of the
European Monetary System after the transitional period.
In February, in enumerated the points which it felt
needed detailed technical examination. The list 
subjects for study is fairly extensive: they range from the
characteristics of the ECU and the techniques for its
creation, to the role of the future European Monetary
Fund and the system s relationship with third currencies.
The Alternates devoted much of the year to this technical
work with the help of contributions from the
Commission departments. Furthermore, on various
occasions throughout the year, the Committee closely
examined the functioning of the European Monetary
'System and found that it had been satisfactory.
4. However, it became apparent that there had been
profound changes in the international economic and
monetary situation since the devising of the European
Monetary System. The repeated oil price rises, the
emergence of serious current payments imbalances, the
resurgence of inflation, the swelling of international
liquidity - all these were developments altering the
framework within which the Committee had 
undertake its work: the problem of reserve assets gained
priority and, in this context, the development of the role
of the ECU acquired new importance. These issues were
set out by the Chairman in a statement delivered to the
Council meeting on 17 March 1980.
5. Subsequently, the European Council meeting on
27 and 28 April paid particular attention to these
problems, 'to the growing deficit in the developing
countries external accounts, the extent of the
petroleum-producing countries' surpluses , the volume of
international liquidity and the effects which these factors
in combination might have on the stability of the
international economic and financial system and on
trade.' Shortly afterwards, the President- in-Office of the
Council invited the Monetary Committee to examine
what initiatives the Community could take in the field of
recycling, and their practical details.
6. In response to this request, the Committee, at its
meeting on 4 June, adopted an opinion on the  issues
raised by the recycling process  (Annex I) which it
forwarded to the Council and the Commission. This
opinion sets out the various aspects of the problem
examines the role of the Community in the recycling
process and concludes by suggesting that, as a
contribution to the smooth de'\!:elopment of this process,
various proposals could be considered, such as the
adaptation of the Community loan mechanism and of
other existing Community instruments.
7. After examining this OpInIOn, the Council, at its
meeting on 9 June, called upon the Committee to
examine in greater depth certain points relating to  the
Community role in the recycling process.  The
Committee therefore resumed its work, and, after
devoting several meetings to this subject, on 10 October
adopted a report on recycling (Annex II) which it
forwarded to the Council and the Commission. The
report deals mainly with the role which the Community
can play in recycling in favour of member countries: it
describes how the Community loan mechanism - set up
in 1975 to aid Member States in balance of payments
difficulties caused by the increase in prices of petroleum
products - should be adapted to the requirements of the
new structure of external payments disequilibria with the
aim of improving its effectiveness. The report also
examines aspects of possible measures in favour 
individual third countries faced with grave balance of
payments difficulties, and contains in annex an opinion
on the use of the ECU as denominator for loans by the
Community, a subject which is also relevant to recycling.
On the basis of this report the Commission in November
presented the Council with a proposal for a Regulation
adjusting the Community loan mechanism designed to
support the balances of payments of Community
Member States. The European Council at its meeting on
1 and 2 December asked that work on the subject be
actively pursued.
8. The Committee concerned itself with other
international monetary problems  besides recycling. As it
does every year, it prepared for the spring and autumn
meetings of the Interim Committee of the International
Monetary Fund and for the IMF and World Bank annual
meeting: for each of these meetings, it examined the draft
text of the statement to be made by the President of the
Council on behalf of the Community. On 2 April, the
Committee also delivered an opinion (Annex III) on the
substitution account under examination at the IMF: this
formed the basis of the joint position put forward by the
Community countries at the April meeting of the IMF
Interim Committee. Lastly, in November, it took the
initiative of delivering an opinion on the monetary and
financial items on the agenda of the United Nations
global negotiations, in which it reaffirmed the guiding
principles in the approach to these problems.
9. During its February meeting the Committee
examined proposals presented by the Commission
departments for improving  economic policy
coordination.  The Committee recognized the paramount
importance of improving coordination, both for the
proper operation of the EMS and for cohesion within the
Community. It stressed that it was preferable to use the25. 5. 81 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 124/3
existing mechanisms more intensively and more
effectively rather than introducing new procedures; but
that consultations on monetary developments in the
Community countries needed to be held as often as
possible, so that sudden changes in one country did not
take its partners by surprise. These views were brought
to the knowledge of the Commission, which took them
into account in its March communication to the Council
on this subject. The Council recorded its general
approval of the ideas put forward in this communication
and invited the various specialised Committees to
strengthen the coordination of their economic policies on
the basis of this communication.
10. It is in this perspective of permanent consultation
that the Committee continued its regular 'tour d'horizon
of  monetary policy developments:  on three occasions, in
April, June and December it concentrated on interest rate
developments in particular. During the year, it also held
in-depth examinations of economic and monetary policy
in the Netherlands and Belgium. The examinations were
based on analytical documents prepared by the
Commission departments, and were led by an examining
member appointed for the occasion.
11. As it does every year and in accordance with its
prerogatives, the Committee was several times consulted
on  agri-monetary matters,  such as the alterations in the
exchange rates of national currencies applicable in the
agricultural sector the codification of existing
agri-monetary regulations, or the exchange rate to be
applied in 1981 in the agricultural sector for Greece.
Ill. WORKING PARTIES OF THE MONETARY COMMI1TEE
12. The Working Party on the Harmonization of
Monetary Policy Instruments, a joint group of the
Monetary Committee and the Committee of Governors
was in May 1980 invited to study from a Community
viewpoint, the proposals put forward in the United
Kingdom s Green Paper on Monetary Control, and in
particular their consistency with UK membership of the
EMS exchange rate mechanism. It met three times for
this purpose and in August presented a report (Annex IV)
to its parent Committees. In this report the Working
Party draws some conclusions and notes that they
indicate certain difficulties which might arise once the
United Kingdom participated fully in the EMS if the
proposed control methods were adopted. In September
the Monetary Committee examined the Working Party
report, endorsed its conclusions, and expressed the wish
that the United Kingdom authorities take them into
consideration.
13. The Working Party on Capital Markets (formerly
Securities Markets) held four meetings in 1980. 
continued to examine developments in the capital
markets of the Member States and in the international
bond markets, and reviewed the policies pursued with
regard to these markets. It also completed its study on
the variability of interest rates and the right to cancel
contracts and continued its work on the development of
savings in equities in Community countries.No C 124/4 Official Journal of the European Communities 25. 5. 81
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ANNEX 1
OPINION TO 1HE COUNCIL AND lHE COMMISSION ON ISSUES RAISED BY lHE
RECYCLING PROCESS
1. Introduction
1. The conclusions of the Presidency of the
European Council of 27 and 28 April 1980 state that ' the
Council paid particular attention to the growing deficit
in. the developing countries' external accounts, the extent
of the petroleum-producing countries' surpluses, the
volume of international liquidity and the effects which
these factors in combination might have on the stability
of the international economic and financial system and
on trade. The Council took the view that to deal with
these problems it would be necessary to step up
cooperation in appropriate forms between States and
with the relevant international institutions.' The
President-in-Office of the Council subsequently invited
the Monetary Committee to examine what initiatives the
Community could take in the field of recycling, and their
practical details. The Committee accordingly met on
20 May and 4 June 1980 and the present opinion sets out
the results of its examination.
2. Following the 1973-74 oil price rise, the financing
of the resulting payments imbalances was managed with
greater ease than originally envisaged. In the first place,
the import-absorbing capacity of OPEC revealed itself to
be larger than forecast, while the relative price of oil
declined fairly rapidly, so that the overall OPEC surplus
- which had been predicted to persist for many years -
declined to modest and manageable proportions by
1978, while a number of OPEC countries began to incur
deficits. Secondly, the international financial markets
and the commercial banks provided finance on a
considerable scale, amounting to about two-thirds of the
net external financing required by the non-oil developing
countries.
1.3. The present situation seems to be more difficult.
The large oil-induced payments imbalances (the OPEC
surplus is projected to reach US $ 100-120 billion or
even more in 1980 and the counter-part deficit some US
$ 80 billion for the OECD area - of which US $ 33
billion for the Community - and US $ 60 billion for the
non-oil developing countries) are likely to raise much
more serious and lasting problems than in the period
after 1973- , and this for a variety of reasons:
the OPEC surplus is expected to persist for a longer
period, as the relative price of oil is likely to be
maintained or even increased. Although the imports
of goods and services by the oil-producing countries
should again grow substantially, it remains to be seen
to what extent the exceptionally marked increase
which took place after the 1973-74 oil price rise can
be repeated;
though the role of the commercial banks will remain
prominent, they may well be reluctant to continue
net lending on as large a scale in real terms as in the
past and to disproportionately increase their
exposure at least  vis-a-vis  certain individual
developing country borrowers; private balance of
payments financing could thus become both
quantitatively tighter, with higher spreads and
shorter maturities, and more selective, with the
poorer countries and perhaps some of the major
borrowers finding their borrowing capacity more
circumscribed. These tendencies have already shown
some signs of developing in the syndicated
medium-term credit market;
the debt burden qf the non-oil LDC' is now
considerably larger: their outstanding public and
publicly guaranteed medium- and long-term external
debt has increased threefold in nominal terms
between end 1973 and end 1979 (from US $ 75
billion to about US $ 250 billion) and nearly doubled
in real terms, and the debt-carrying capacity of
certain countries may be approaching its limit.
1.4. The Committee feels that recycling will be
effected without major difficulties in 1980, and possibly
, in 1981, given especially the build-up of reserve holdings
by the majority of the developing countries in recent
years and the volume of bank credits committed but not
yet disbursed. It cannot however be assumed that
recycling will be automatically smooth and problem-free
in the years beyond, when access to the international
markets is expected to become more restricted and debt
servicing difficulties could arise for a number of
individual countries.
2. Aspects of the recycling problem
1. Although credit systems and markets have played
their role with effectiveness and flexibility, the whole
range of domestic and international financial
relati~)flships has been deeply affected by the first oil25. Official Journal of the European Communities No C 124/7
shock. The stability of the international banking system
has been subjected to unprecedented strains, flows
through the international markets have increased very
rapidly without control and exchange rate movements
have been wide and sometimes erratic. Adjustment has
been insufficient in a number of cou~tries where inflation
rates in 1978 were still well above pre-1973 levels. In
recent years, the need to improve the supervision of the
system has been recognized. It has led to internationally
coordinated actions in prudential bank supervision, to
new proposals to improve still further the surveillance of
Eurocurrency markets and to various initiatives to render
less disruptive the process of currency diversification.
The launching of the European Monetary System has to
be seen in the same context. The Committee expresses
the view that after the second oil shock, reinforced
international and Community action on these various
fronts is even more necessary and that it will greatly
contribute to a smooth process of recycling.
2. Recycling is a process by which the surpluses run
by certain countries - in this case ' the oil-producing
countries - are made available to countries in balance of
payments deficit. This process is based to a large extent
on international financial intermediation, both public
and private, which ensures a certain transformation
between the forms of investment offered to the surplus
countries and the financing terms offered to the deficit
countrIes.
3. This process involves a transformation of
maturities, and sometimes a substitution of currencies
since the oil-producers generally wish to lend for a
shorter period than that desired by the borrowers and
sometimes in a currency other than the dollar. Costs and
risks are associated with - though not specific to 
recycling operation: transformation costs, possibly
exchange risks, and default risks. These costs and risks
can vary, depending on the extent of the transformation
undergone by the financial assets in the intermediation
process and on the financial situation of the funds' final
recipient; they also vary with the procedures adopted for
making the funds raised available to the recipient. If
funds are lent on conditions more favourable than those
on which they were raised, budgetary costs ensue. All
these costs and risks must be -Shouldered in one way or
another.
2.4. The Committee stresses that while financing
payments imbalances due to the new oil price is
necessary, adjustment to the new terms of trade through
appropriate demand and supply policies is the
fundamental way to restore a stable growth path in the
importing economies. The achievement of the proper
mix of financing and adjustment cannot be assured by
markets alone. Indeed, it should be the major
preoccupation of policies in the years to come. The right
combination of adjustment and financing needs to be
defined for each country, but the financing granted must
not be the pretext for postponing the necessary
adjustment either in the rapidly industrialising countries
or in the industrialized countries; for the poorest
countries, an increase in development aid seems a
necessary element in any solution.
5. Financing can be granted either mainly through
the international banking system, i.e. by the markets, or
through official channels (Governments, international
institutions). The Committee feels that in official
interventions in favour of recycling the Bretton Woods
institutions have an essential role to play, not only in
view of the IBRD's particular vocation to the financing
of developing countries, but above all because they
constitute the fora in which all the main actors of the
recycling process are present: the United States, whose
exchange rate policy is a central element, as well as the
OPEC countries and the other international
participants. The distinction between official and private
forms of financing is very important for the distribution
of risks and for setting the conditions of financing
operations. It has, however, become increasingly clear
that rigid separation would not be desirable and would
entail the danger of official bodies being brought in only
at a stage when the general economic conditions in the
debtor countries were already seriously deteriorated.
This is evidenced by the emergence and success of
intermediate formulae in which international institutions
cooperate with commercial banks (consortia,
cofinancing). In addition, in the majority of cases, deficit
countries make joint calls on the two forms of credit and
often the banks grant financing only after the
international institutions have themselves done so: for
commercial banks, this is a way of taking account of the
country risk since they are not themselves in a position to
impose economic policy conditions on the recipient
countrIes. '
6. As regards the terms and the use of the funds, it is
usual to make a distinction between grant aid and loans
on the one hand; and between loans intended for the
execution of projects and loans designed to finance the
external payments deficit on the other. Different risks,
techniques and conditions are associated with these
different forms, and these must be taken into account in
a recycling policy. In practice, however, when loans carry
interest subsidies, a grace period or the granting of a
guarantee, they contain a grant element. As regards the
loans themselves, the structural adjustment loans
towards which the World Bank is moving represent a
category which straddles both project and balance of
payments financing.No C 124/8 Official Journal of the European Communities 25. 5. 81
3. The role of the Community in strengthening the
recycling process
1. Without substituting itself to the normal
recycling process nor competing with them the
Community has a particular role to play in the context of
the present payments imbalances. It has important
trading relationships with OPEC, being the biggest oil
importer and at the same time the main supplier of goods
and services to the OPEC countries, accounting for 40 %
of their imports. In addition, it maintains special
relationships with certain groups of countries
(Mediterranean, ACP) which are themselves trading
parmers of the oil-producing countries, and whose
financial situation is, in some cases precarious.
Furthermore, because of its geographical proximity to
the Mediterranean and oil-producing countries, the
equilibrium and the economic and political stability of
both of them are of vital importance for the Community.
The Community aspect of the problem is also related to
the need to shelter the intra-Community exchange
relations from the pressures which would result from
prolonged monetary disturbances and would concentrate
on certain Community currencies, and to the
opportunity to use the 'Community potential' if it is
more effective and less costly than a mere juxtaposition
of national actions even if coordinated. The
Community s collective borrowing capacity is large, its
credit standing excellent and it constitutes a zone of
monetary stability. Any action which the Community
could undertake would have a new character with
respect to the events following the first oil shock: it
would be the action of a Community in which all
members will be in a position of current account deficit.
It would therefore have to be effected essentially by
means of borrowed resources and not by means of the
transfer of . surpluses earned by its members.
Furthermore, if a deterioration in international political
and economic relations and a widening of the gulf
between the richest and the poorest countries were to
raise concern, the Community must make an active
contribution to the solutions, on a world scale, to the
serious problems posed by the existence of structural
imbalances in current payments.
2.  Contribution to action at a world level
1. The Committee agrees that the bulk of the
recycling activity will continue to be carried out by  the
international financial markets and the commercial
banks.  In view of the important contribution of the
international banking system in this respect, the
Community should fully support efforts directed at
safeguarding the soundness and the stability of the
system at strengthening regular and systematic
monitoring of its activities and at maintaining sound
banking standards in international lending. The press
communique released by the Bank of International
Settlements on behalf of the central bank Governors 
the Group of Ten countries and Switzerland, on 15 April
1980, marks a positive step forward towards the
achievement of these ends.
2. The Committee stresses that the important role
of the international banking system will have to be
increasingly supplemented by an expanded activity of the
international organizations,  and primarily of the
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the
regional development banks. These are the institutions
suited to this end, all the main participants are
adequately represented, the necessary funds are for the
immediate future largely available and the mechanisms
to incite borrowers to undertake the appropriate
adjustment policies are present. The IMF still has
substantial funds available. An adequate application of
the Fund' principles is required including a
conditionality adapted to the requriements of an
adjustment which, at times, is of a structural nature. The
Fund' s larger role in recycling and its possible recourse to
direct borrowing from surplus countries, as
recommended by the Interim Committee meeting in
Hamburg on 25 April 1980, must also be supported and
encouraged, and the efforts directed at implementing a
properly designed and operational substitution account
must be pursued. The World Bank also has an important
contribution to make. Better coordination and close
cooperation between the IMF, the World Bank and
regional financial organizations should be sought and
developed, while their resources could be directed in a
larger measure to programme or structural adjustment
lending. These institutions could also develop
consortium type operations joint examination of
external indebtedness, etc. The Community should
further examine these possibilities with a view to playing
an active and unified role within these organizations and
support new initiatives aimed at improving and
expanding their role. The Committee is of the opinion
that the Community should define common positions on
these different points which would be communicated to
the officials who represent the Member States in the IMF
and the World Bank.
3. The  oil-exporting countries  have an essential
part in the recycling process. A large part of the oil funds
are at present directed towards short-term Eurocurrency
deposits. Given the risks involved in this situation for
international monetary stability, the Community should
encourage the OPEC countries to place the oil surpluses
at longer-term, either in the markets or outside them, in
the forms of direct loans to the developing countries, to
cooperate more actively with the international
organizations and to participate in 'triangular
arrangements. The Community should, in any case,
endeavour to establish closer contacts with the oil
exporting countries.25. 5. 81 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 124/9
3.  Direct Community interventions
The member countries
3.3.1. The Community s primary responsibility is
towards its members. In all the member countries, whose
combined deficit in 1980 will exceed US $ 30 billion 
over one quarter of the OPEC surp\us - the adjustment
process is envisaged or has begun. However, structural
conditions and inflation rates were very diverse at the
time of the second oil shock, and adjustment policies are
not likely to achieve everywhere the same results. Seen in
the light of long-standing difficulties, this represents not
only a threat to monetary cohesion and economic
convergence, but also a potential danger for the actual
unity of the market. It is incumbent on the Community
institutions to play their proper part in promoting the
convergence of economic results and in helping' organize
such action as may prove necessary to combine
adjustment and financing in the proper proportions to
ward off this threat and this danger. The Community has
various financing mechanisms and instruments: first, it
has a specific mechanism for balance of payments
financing based on external borrowing (Community
loans), created in 1975, following the first oil shock; it
also grants loans to finance investment projects - which
often contain an aid element, interest subsidies - and
sometimes programmes, through the EIB, and financial
instruments for structural purposes (Euratom loans,
ECSC loans, new Community instrument).
2. To support the efforts of its members, the
Community should undertake action on two fronts: that
of general economic coordination on the one hand, and
that of financing instruments, if necessary, on the other.
The Committee feels that the strengthening of the
coordination of economic policies is essential so that
the Community authorities can help promote
adjustment before a country s balance of payments
and exchange rate relationships are threatened, and
so that the necessary adjustment is not unduly
postponed by resorting to unconditional bank
financing. One way in which the Community could
help in this respect might be by more closely linking
private financing operations with Community credits
through a sort of 'early conditionality' which the
Community is in a position to recommend for its
members, but whose modalities remain to be studied
by the Committee.
As to Community financing operations, the Committee is
of the opinion that the Community must first and above
all make the most of the existing instruments, adapting
their size and their terms when necessary to improve
their effectiveness. In this regard the following
possibilities were mentioned in the Committee:
increasing the volume of Community loans, set up in
1975, whose available margin is limited, and
improving this mechanism, so that it can make a
more effective and more complementary
contribution both to the financing of acceptable
deficits and to the macroeconomic adjustment of
member countries;
adjusting the Community s borrowing techniques in
respect of all its instruments (Community, ECSC,
Eurat~m, new Community instrument, EIB) (1) in the
light of the need to raise from the surplus countries
the maximum amount of funds required;
strengthening the structural instruments - notably
the new Community instrument - and giving their
management rules the necessary flexibility.
Outside the Community
3.3.3. Beyond its own frontiers, the Community,
maintains special relations, which include an important
financial aspect, with certain countries (applicant and
Mediterranean countries, ACP countries). Thus the
Community grants loans, usually with interest rate
subsidies on the Community budget, or through the EDF
for the ACP countries. The loans are granted by the EIB
under special financial protocols or by the EDF under the
Lome convention; in each case they relate to the
financing of specific projects. The Community is also
involved in operations of a wider nature, in particular the
guaranteeing of export earnings (Stabex) under the Lome
convention, which is a form of balance of payments
support and the financial and food aid operations to the
developing countries in general. In the context 
recycling, immediate interest centres on the
Community s lending activities to the countries with
which it maintains special relations. The Lome
convention has just been renewed and involves an
expansion of these activities. The Community is also
engaged in preparing new financial protocols with the
Mediterranean countries for the five-year period
beginning in 1981. It is important to bear in mind the
need for recycling to the benefit of these countries, in so
far as this need can, be satisfied by the type of investment
financing to which the Community instruments are
suited. The Committee also raised the question as to
whether the Community could not resort to the
technique of structural adjustment loans. Beyond this,
the Community, within the framework of the IMF and
the World Bank, will have to seek action which brings a
positive response to these problems.
) The Committee has been informed of the work carried out
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Criteria and procedures 4. Final comments
3.3.4. In the face of a problem of a financial nature
such as recycling, which will extend over a period of
several years, the Committee stresses that though the
existence of the European Monetary System and the
future transition to its institutional phase are factors of
major importance for the Community, this issue should
not be linked with the immediate problems of recycling.
Whereas in a later stage the ECU could permit more
effective measures by its contribution to the stability of
the international monetary system, the Committee feels
that the allocation to it of an external role in response to
the immediate necessities of recycling would be liable to
jeopardize its balanced and durable establishment. In the
present phase it is preferable to limit its role to that of
denominator of paper which could be offered by the
Community institutions in order to, if necessary, have a
greater and more direct access to the oil surpluses.
3.3.5. ' The Committee had a preliminary exchange of
views on the implications for the Member States and for
the Community of the recycling operations which the
Community could undertake, whatever their destination.
These implications would include the shouldering of part
of the risks and costs mentioned above in paragraph 2.3.
This would presumably be justified by recognition either
of the reduction of the overall cost by means of a
Community intervention, or by benefits of a general
nature such as greater economic convergence and better
monetary equilibrium. A recognition of the importance
of these factors is a prerequisite for the further
examination of the technical procedures of a Community
initiative.
At the end of this initial examination of the recycling
problem, the Committee would like to stress that its
remarks were preliminary in nature and require further
consideration. Nevertheless, certain points can be made:
recycling is likely to be generally manageable in
1980, and possibly in 1981, but difficulties are to be
expected for the years beyond;
the bulk of recycling activity should be effected
through the markets, but the international
institutions will have to support, supplement and
strengthen private initiatives; for the poorest
countries an increase in development aid seems a
necessary element in any solution;
in the face of a problem which is external in origin
and international in scale the Community as an
entity must support the efforts made in the wider
international context.
Various proposals could be considered:
the use of a variety of cofinancing formulae;
the adaptation of the Community loan mechanism
, and of other existing Community instruments;
the setting up of triangular financing schemes, with
the participation of the Community, the OPEC
countries and the developing countries (associated or
ACP).
The Committee is ready to undertake any further studies
on these points which the Council might deem
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INTRODUCTION
The Committee s opinIon on issues raised by the
recycling process (doc. 11/267/8,0 dated 4 June 1980) was
referred to the Council meeting on 9 June 1980; the
Council then called upon the Committee to examine the
following points in greater depth:
1. the Community s role in the recycling process in the
framework of the international organizations;
2. the Community loan mechanism and the other
Community instruments for recycling in favour of
the member countries of the Community;
3. the instruments for recycling in favour of third
countries (e.g. the possibility of opening a window
for third countries in the Community loan
mechanism);
4. the link between adjustment and financing, problems
of surveillance and 'early conditionality
5. cofinancing and triangular operations;
6. costs and risks (guarantees, transformation, etc.
resources available and tentative quantification of
possible actions.
Part I of this Report examines the Community s role in
recycling in favour of member countries, through an
adjustment of the Community loan mechanism, and the
related questions of conditionality, surveillance and the
mix between adjustment and financing; the other points
of the Council's mandate, including the aspects of
recycling to non-member countries, are examined in Part
II. The Committee has furthermore delivered a separate
opinion on another issue relevant to recycling, i.e. the
use of the ECU as a denominator for loans floated by
the Community institutions (doc. 11/397/80 dated
8 September 1980 - in Annex).
The Committee would point out that the present Report
should be seen as complementary to its opinion of 4 June
1980, in which the issues raised by the recycling process
were examined in their general terms and in a broader
context. In particular, the opinion defined recycling as '
process by which the surpluses run by certain countries 
in this case the oil-producing countries - are made
available to countries in balance of payments deficit.
This process is based to a large extent on international
financial intermediation, both public and private, which
makes possible a certain transformation between the
forms of investment offered to the surplus countries and
the financing terms offered to the deficit countries
Furthermore, the opinion stressed that ' the bulk of the
recycling activity will continue to be carried out by the
international financial markets and the commercial
banks '. . . supplemented by an expanded activity of the
international organizations, and primarily of the
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the
regional development banks . The Community as an
entity must on the one hand support the efforts made in
this wider international context, and on the other has a
particular role of its own to play in the context of the
present payments imbalances.
I. ADJUSTING THE COMMUNITY LOAN MECHANISM
The Committee has devoted itself to examining how the
Community loan mechanism set up in 1975 should be
adapted to the requirements of the new structure of
external payments disequilibria, the aim being to
improve its effectiveness and enable the Community to
contribute to the harmonious development of the
recycling process. In this part of the Report the
Committee studies the problems connected with the
financing of the deficits of Member States.
1. Aim, duration and ranking of the mechanism
1.1. According to Article 1 of Regulation (EEC) No
397/75 which set up the mechanism
, '
the Community
may undertake a series of operations to raise funds
either directly from third countries and financial
institutions, or on the capital markets, with the sole aim
of re-Iending those funds to one or more Member States
in balance of payments difficulties caused by the increase
in prices of petroleum products
The Committee feels that the wording of this Article
should be clarified. It accepts the notion of ' sole aim' if it
is understood that its intention is merely that of ensuring
that the Community borrows solely in order to re-Iend to
one or more Member States. As regards the cause of the
balance of payments difficulties, the Committee is of the
opinion that the relevant phrase should read as follows:
balance of payments difficulties directly or indirectly
related to an increase in prices of petroleum products
1.2. As regards the duration of the mechanism, which
was not specified in the 1975 Regulation, the Committee
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basis of a report from the Commission, examine whether
the Community loan in its principle, its arrangements
and its ceiling still meets the needs which led to its
creation.
1.3. Since it does not directly involve the commitment
of member countries' foreign exchange reserves, this
instrument is still, as far as its general design 
concerned, well suited to the requirements of recycling.
There is however, the question of whether any order of
priorities should be assigned to the way in which calls are
made on the various resources available to the national
authorities to finance an external payments deficit
(international capital markets, Community assistance
IMF facilities). The Committee discussed this question
and concluded that no  a priori  position should be taken
on the matter, so as to be able to react to circumstances
in the best way possible.
The Council Decision of 8 May 1964 on cooperation
between Member States in the field of international
monetary relations (64/30l/EEC) provides that
consultations shall take place within the Monetary
Committee in respect of any important decision or
position taken by Member States in the field of
international monetary relations and concerning in
particular: . . . recourse by a Member State to resources
which can be mobilized within the framework 
international agreements . It is in the framework of these
consultations that the ranking of calls on the various
sources of financing could be examined.
Similarly, the Committee did not consider it useful to
attempt to establish priorities in the recourse to the
medium-term financial assistance and the Community
loans. Cases are possible in which only one of the two
could be used, and others in which both could be used
simultaneously. In the present situation, with all the
Member States running current payments deficits
financing by Community borrowing, in accordance with
the needs of recycling, may be the form of Community
support which could most easily be mobilized in practice.
2. Techniques
Experience of the past lending operations has shown that
the procedure for implementing the mechanism is at
times excessively rigid:
1. Raising the loan (Article 2 of Regulation (EEC)
No 397/75), after a loan application by a Member State
requires the Council, after consulting the Monetary
Committee, to authorize the Commission to negotiate
with the lenders; the Monetary Committee must again be
consulted after the negotiations, and finally, a further
Council decision is required to authorize the borrowing
and lending operations involved. Experience has shown
this procedure to be lengthy - in the first implementation
of the mechanism, approximately one year intervened
between the initial request and the funds' disbursement-
and too cumbersome, in that it does not always permit
the Community to adapt easily to market conditions.
The Committee considers that this procedure should be
simplified so as to, if possible, reduce the references to
Council to only one: the Council's role could consist in
authorizing the lending of a specified amount for a
specified country (and the corresponding borrowing),
and in simultaneously setting the economic policy
conditions before the conclusion of the negotiations with
the lenders; the ensuing operations would be carried out
by the Commission in consultation with the Monetary
Committee.
2. Experience with loans that have been made under
the mechanism has revealed one unsatisfactory feature
namely that a country that had borrowed through the
mechanism and was in a position to repay its borrowings
ahead of their due date was not able to do so because
there was no means whereby the Community itself could
prematurely redeem the funds which it had borrowed
and on-lent. There is not much sense in setting economic
policy conditions for a Member State whose position has
already recovered and is ready to repay a loan granted to
it. Therefore, whenever a borrowing member so wished
and agreed to the terms of the borrowing this would
involve, explicit provision should be made for the
possibility of early repayment. Allowing advance
repayment clearly implies having recourse to the usual
borrowing formulae prevalent on the market, which
would expressly contain an early redemption clause.
3. Instead of giving preference to the issue of bonds
as has been the case hitherto, the Commission should
dispose of the necessary flexibility in its borrowing
operations, both to facilitate the possibility of early
repayments discussed above and to make the best of
market conditions. It should thus be able to have
recourse to the other instruments available on the
markets and to new instruments such 
ECU-denominated loans, and it should explore and
develop the possibilities of borrowing directly from
surplus countries. In practice, however, variable rate
loans should not be given preference over fixed rate
borrowing; they should in particular be avoided as far as
possible when borrowing directly from surplus countries.
At all events, loans denominated or payable in the
currency of a Member State should be issued only after
the agreement of the competent national authorities. In
this context, the provision under Article 2 of Regulation
(EEC) No 397/75, whereby the average period of loans
may not be less than five years, should be made more
flexible, it being understood that the Community should
not engage in maturity transformation. It is therefore
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mutual agreement between borrowing Member States
and the Commission, in consultation with the Monetary
Committee.
3. Conditionality
1. As requested by the Council, the Committee
proceded to define the modalities which might govern
the concept of early conditionality mentioned in its
opinion of 4 June 1980. In practice this means that a
country may have recourse to the Community loan
before serious balance of payments difficulties have
arisen, rather than after a situation of manifest crisis.
This implies an appropriate concept of conditionality. It
is in fact in the Community interest to promote
adjustment in a member country, through the
contribution of even a modest financing, before this
country reaches a situation of manifest crisis. On the
other hand, a country may have an interest in relying on
Community conditionality to promote the adoption of
an adjustment programme  vis-a-vis  its own public
opInIOn.
2.  Graduation of conditionality.  ' Conditionality
should aim at restoring a sustainable balance of
payments situation and should concern not only the
demand side but place greater emphasis on the structural
adaptations required in the medium term, particularly as
regards energy. This concept of conditionality should at
the same time contribute to increased convergence in the
Community. Conditionality itself will have to be adapted
to the situation of the country seeking a loan
particularly to the sustainability of the forecast deficits
having regard to the country s external indebtedness and
to the possibilities of financing these deficits. The more
serious the Member State s economic situation, the more
specific endeavours on the supply side, particularly in the
energy field, will have to be supplemented by general
,adjustment measures on the demand side. This may
imply setting monetary or fiscal targets. These targets
would be set at regular intervals by the Council, acting
on a proposal by the Commission and after consulting
the Monetary Committee; compliance would 
monitored, at regular intervals, jointly by the
Commission and the Committee. It may be desirable for
the loan to be disbursed in successive instalments, the
release of each instalment being subject to compliance
with the programme s objectives.
3.3.  Council procedures.  In practice the situation of a
country facing balance of payments difficulties and
intending to adopt an adjustment programme and to
, have recourse to a Community loan would be assessed by
the Council on a proposal by the Commission, after the
Monetary Committee had been consulted and had made
its examination. The Council could grant a Community
loan against the country s undertaking to conform to an
adjustment programme, whose nature and validity
would be the subject of a Monetary Committee opinion.
Furthermore, according to the, seriousness of the
situation, or its development, the country could be asked
to respect specific quantified targets.
3.4.  Procedures in the Monetary Committee.  The
Committee feels that a mutual information and
monitoring procedure on the balance of payments and
external indebtedness positions of all member countries
and on the policies pursued in these areas should be
established. Essentially this would mean reinforcing and
making more systematic the exchange of information
which already takes place. Such a procedure falls within
the Committee s competence, and the Committee has
agreed to establish it as soon as possible.
4. Guarantee
1. In the event of default by the final borrower, the
guarantee arrangements for the Community s creditors
consist in participation by the Member States in
accordance with a procedure laid down in Article 6 of
Regulation (EEC) No 397/75 and in Articles 1 to 9 of
Regulation (EEC) No 398/75, and in a token entry of the
liabilities in the Community Budget to ensure that the
creditors are paid without delay.
2. The Committee stressed that - as the experience
of past decades has shown - the likelihood of default by
any Community Member State is practically nil and it is
in this light that it examined whether the present
dual-guarantee system ought to be maintained. It is clear
that the present system will remain in force with respect
to the Community s loan operations carried out under
Regulations (EEC) No 397/75 and (EEC) No 398/75.
Several members felt that the entry in the Community
Budget constitutes in itself a commitment by the
Community - i. e. by the Member States - which is
sufficient to satisfy lenders and that there is consequently
no need for a special or adjacent guarantee. Abolition of
the system of guarantees by the Member States would
correspond to the Community nature of the instrument
and make it simpler to implement. Payments in the event
of default would be made according to normal budgetary
procedures. Other members felt the maintenance of the
present dual-guarantee system would be preferable,
either because they felt that every effort should be made
to avoid exhausting at some date the Community
budget s financing capacity, or because they questioned
the interpretation the markets could give to the scrapping
of the counter-guarantees by the Member States.
3. It should be noted that, were the counter-
guarantee system by Member States to be maintained
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the amount of the Community loan authorized by the
Council to a parliamentary procedure, which would
result in a further delay, as happened in 1975 when the
system was set up. Between the Council's political
dedsion and the termination of the procedure in the last
country, the delay could thus be long enough for a
modification of the international financial environment
to intervene.
5. Ceiling
The Committee feels it advisable to recommend the
following adjustments. It points out in this respect that, if
these modifications are adopted, they will require a
decision in the form of a Council Regulation and
particularly if the Member States' counter-guarantee
system is maintained, certain member countries might
find themselves bound to the precedent of 1975 to make.
their agreement subject to parliamentary procedure.
1.  Denomination.  In conformity with other
decisions taken within the Community, the ceiling
should be denominated in ECU and not in US dollars.
2.  Calculation of the ceiling.  Interst on borrowing
operations should henceforth be excluded from the
ceiling, in line with normal international practice in the
matter: the ceiling fixed by the Council would therefore
relate only to the principal. As an example, applying this
new method to the nominal figure authorized at present
would - in the present market conditions - entail an
increase of about one half in the borrowing capacity.
5.3.  Definition of the ceiling.  The ceiling should be
considered as a limit on all outstanding amounts, i. e. the
borrowing and lending resources would be reconstituted
as and when repayments were made. If a margin can be
reconstituted, there is no need to return to the Council
each time the ceiling is exhausted, it being nevertheless
understood that each activation of the mechanism is
subject to prior authorisation by the Council.
5.4.  Increase in the ceiling.  The general feeling of the
Committee is that the ceiling should be increased from
that decided in 1975 (three billion US dollars in principal
and interest payments). The modifications described
above would by themselves, if ad()pted entail a
significant increase.
5.4.1. Certain ar.guments may be put forth in support
of a more substantial increase:
the erosion in the ceiling s real value since 1975;
the need to reverse the decline in the prt:sent ceiling in
relation to the size of the international capital
market, whose annual volume of operations has
tripled since 1975;
the Community s current deficit is at present larger in
proportion to trade and output than was the case
followi~g the last oil shock and is expected to persist
for longer; a higher ceiling is thus necessary for the
mechanism to contribute significantly to recycling;
while after the first oil shock there were still a number
of surplus countries within the Community, now all
Community countries are in current deficit;
the desire for coherence with the increase in the size
of the credit mechanisms decided when the European
Monetary System was set up, in order to have the
same credibility and positive announcement effects
on the exchange markets: it must be observed in this
regard that in spite of their significant resources the
two mechanisms have not been used, which confirms
their psychological effect;
the need to allow a number of large borrowers to
have recourse to the mechanism simultaneously
without exhausting its facilities, in contrast to the
present situation (over 80 % of the funds available
were promptly taken up by loans to two member
countries).
5.4.2. Other arguments may be put forth in support
of a more modest increase:
the higher level of reserves, not least. the result of the
gold valuation within the EMS, and the relatively
high credit worthiness of all Community countries
create a better basis for the financing of deficits
which is now becoming necessary;
when the EMS was set up, short-term monetary
support and medium-term financial assistance were
more than doubled, iri order to give a credible
guarantee of the stability of exchange rates as regards
the foreign exchange markets; neither of the two
instruments has been used so far, which therefore
leaves a borrowing margin available;
in order to maintain the high credit standing with
regard to its various borrowing instruments, the
Community must give an example of a disciplined
not a permissive policy;
it must be demonstrated both internally and
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adjustment possible to the changed conditions of the
world economy;
the Community should not compete too hard for
OPEC funds with other methods of recycling of
special importance throughout the world, e.g. direct
channelling to the developing countries, making
funds available for the IMF and the World Bank, etc.
5.4.3. The members of the Committee who support
the first set of arguments (504.1.) consider that it would
justify a ceiling of between 10 and 15 billion ECU. The
members of the Committee who support the second set
of arguments (504. ) consider that it would justify 
ceiling of between four and five billion ECu. Some
members however could sympathise with some of the
arguments presented in 504.1. and some of the arguments
presented in 5.4.2. They therefore felt that a compromise
should be found between the two ranges indicated above.
In all cases, the Committee members based their
assessments on the assumption that the proposals
advanced in paragraphs 5. , 5.2 and 5.3 are adopted.
50404. Several members pointed out that fixing a
ceiling is essential only if it were decided to maintain the
counter-guarantee system subscribed by Member States.
In fact, the Council is called upon to decide, in each
particular case, the amount of the borrowing operations
authorized and therefore remains master of the overall
volume of such loans. One could therefore refrain from
preventively fixing the ceiling for such operations and
assess the size of the envisaged loans each time the
activation of the mechanism is requested.
5.4.5. As a formation of independent experts, the
Committee has the general feeling that a compromise
around seven billion ECU would have some chance of
being a point of equilibrium and would not pose
particular financial or technical problems (1).
) The alternate members of two countries preferred not to
take a position on this point.
II. OrnER ASPECTS OF RECYCLING
These other aspects cover points 1 (international
organizations), 3 (recycling for the benefit of
non-member countries), 5 (cofinancing) and 6 (costs and
risks) on the list drawn up by the Council. The
Committee s work on these points is a follow-up to the
opinion of 4 June: it continues the analysis and defines
certains solutiops.
6. Costs and risks
The Committee started by drawing a distinction between
the 'recycling' aspect and the 'aid' aspect of the problem
of assistance to the developing countries, in order to deal
only with recycling proper: it is nevertheless aware not
only of the need to increase development aid so as to
enable the poorest countries to overcome their
difficulties, but also of the fact that intervention by
public bodies in the recycling process would entail
shouldering part of the risks and costs - transformation
costs, possibly exchange risks and default risks.
7. The Community and the international institutions
In its Opinion of 4 June, the Committee considered that
the Bretton Woods institutions have an essential role to
play and called on the Community to play an active and
unified role within these institutions, and to support new
initiatives aimed at improving and expanding that role.
The Community should in particular support the
proposals for the IMF to borrow directly from surplus
countries, for better coordination between the IMF, the
IBRD and regional financial organizations, and for the
development of consortium-type operations and
structural adjustment loans. The Community should
endeavour to coordinate its interventions in the fora in
which international monetary questions are discussed,
not only in the Bretton Woods institutions but also - in
the present context of global negotiations - 
organizations such as the United Nations. This means
defining a common position in advance, or, at the very
least, coordinating more closely the positions upheld by
the Member States' representatives in these institutions.
The Mo~etary Committee could be invited to intensify
its action in this field.
8. Third country financing
1. For geographic and political reasons,
non-member countries have different relations with the
Community according to whether they are candidates for
accession (or potential candidates), associated countries,
ACP countries or other countries. The Committee is
aware of the fact that the assessment of the problem can
be modulated according to membership to one or other
of these groups.
2. The general feeling of the Committee is that the
formal opening in the Community loan mechanism of a
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appropriate at this time. The Community cannot take the
place of the IMF, which is equipped to deal with
international payments imbalances, has the mechanisms
to induce borrowers to adopt the appropriate adjustment
policies and where lastly, the main parties to the
recycling process are represented. The Community s role
must be to support the efforts of the Fund, and even to
supplement its action in certain specific cases by making
its own or its members' contribution to solving a
particular problem.
8.-3. Although it felt that a window in favour of
non-member countries should not be opened when the
Community loan mechanism is adjusted, the Committee
nevertheless considers that for certain countries and in
certain circumstances, the Member States and the
Community could take part in joint measures for the
benefit of countries in serious payments difficulties. This
has happened in the past and it should not be ruled out
that it might happen in the future. By way of example
these measures have taken various forms in the past:
rescheduling of the external debt, granting of guarantees
action on export credits, accelerating the implementation
of financial protocols, etc. The countries particularly
concerned are those which, because of their geographical
proximity or their political and commercial links,
maintain close relations with the Community. The
Committee considers that when such actions are
undertaken, it would be advisable for the member
countries to confer together at Community level and
even, if necessary, for the Community as such to
participate. It also felt that, despite the special nature of
these measures, their design and implementation must
follow a number of guiding principles. Thought must be
given to these guiding principles within the Community-
a task which the Committee could assume. Thus, not
only could these  ad hoc  measures be made more
effective, but also the functioning of the normal
financing instruments need not to be distorted by the
pressure of events.
9. Co financing and triangular operations
1. The Community can make a third contribution to
strengthening the recycling for the benefit of both its
members and non-member countries by continuing and
expanding the cofinancing and triangular financing
operations in which certain Community institutions are
already involved.
2. The EIB is already carrying out loan operations
for the benefit of non-member countries and its
borrowing operations on markets outside the
Community draw partly on the savings of the
oil-producing countries. It also contributes to the
recycling process, as does the EDF, by associating oil
capital in co-financing operations. Thus, under the first
Lome Convention, the EDF and the EIB contributed
17 % and Arab funds 19 % to financing a group of
cofinanced projects totalling 3. billion E~A.
Cofinancing operations have also been carried out under
association agreements with the Mediterranean
countries and in connection with aid to non-associated
developing countries.
9.3. In the future, these operations are likely to
develop and multiply, both under the new Lome
Convention (five articles of which are exclusively
devoted to cofinancing arrangements) and under the new
financial protocols in preparation. The past and future
development of these operations is largely due to the
attractipn for the holders of large funds of the
Community s activity in the field of project financing,
because of the experience it has acquired, the tested
procedures at its command, and the administrative
technical and financial aid it can grant. The Committee is
aware of the importance of the Community institutions
efforts to develop this type of operations. It feels that in
this area it is desirable for cooperation with the surplus
oil countries and their institutions to be increased in the
most appropriate forms by the authorities responsbile for
the various financial instruments.
10. Characteristics of financial assets
An essential aspect of the problem is that of defining the
characteristics of the financial assets which best meet the
requirements of recycling: on the one hand, every effort
should be made, in the interest of deficit countries, to
obtain as favourable conditions as possible; on the other
attention must be given to offering surplus countries
assets which are sufficiently attractive. The examination
and testing of the appropriate formulae in this area is
being actively pursued in numerous national and
international quarters, both official and private. The
Monetary Committee considers that, given both the
trade links between oil producers and member countries
and the relations uniting the latter within the European
Monetary System, the Community should actively
participate in this research and seize on the occasions
which arise to adopt a common attitude and to promote
the most effective financial innovations possible. The
examination of the characteristics of the financial assets
which best meet the requirements of recycling should
continue and involve a detailed discussion on subjects
such as the choice of the duration of the securities,
formulae for borrowing at variable rates, the distribution
of exchange risk. As to the utilization of the ECU, the
Committee recently adopted an opinion which 
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APPENDIX 
OPINION ON lHE USE OF lHE ECU AS DENOMINATOR FOR LOANS
BY lHE COMMUNITY
The way in which the ECU is used and develops is of great importance for the future of the European
Monetary System and its institutions, which the Committee is now studying at the request of the Council.
The use of the ECU could also be relevant to recycling, which is the subject of a further remit by the
Council to the Committee.
As suggestions have been put forward in various Community bodies that the ECU be used as denominator
for loans floated by the Community institutions, the Committee would point out that in its opinion the
following considerations should be taken into account:
1. In order to acquire sufficient experience with ECU-denominated issues, their continuity must be
ensured. For market reasons, it is therefore necessary that such issues be repeated. An experimental
isolated issue is of no interest in itself.
2. For reasons of consistency, care must be taken to see that the solutions devised for the technical
problems arising in defining the characteristics of an issue are closely coordinated and are homogenous
between the various Community issuers.
3. The Community s excellent credit standing and the quality of the ECU in relation to other
numeraires offer the prospect of ECU-denominated issues being made on good terms. When a reasonably
broad market in such issues had developed they might, if conditions are right, be made at a somewhat
more favourable interest rate than the weighted average of the interest rates attaching to loans
denominated in the currencies of Member States. In the initial stages however the narrowness of the
market may prevent this.
APPENDIX 
LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF ADJUSTING lHE COMMUNITY LOAN MECHANISM
1. While it does not consider itself qualified to decide on the questions of legislative, budgetary and
accounting procedures implied by adjustments to the Community loan mechanism, the Monetary
Committee draws attention to certain consequences of the changes it ptoposes.
2. It is understood that it is for the Council, acting unanimously, to determine the adjustments to the
mechanism at present in force by a regulation adopted on the basis of Article 235 of the Treaty; however
the question of whether the Member States should make their agreement subject to a national
parliamentary procedure has not been settled. Three arguments have been put forward:
Several members felt that a national parliamentary pro~edure is not required when the Council adopts
a decision under Article 235. The regulation adjusting the loan mechanism would therefore be
immediately applicable even if the present dual-guarantee system were maintained, and all the more
so if it were abolished.
Other I11t'mners felt that if the Member States maintained the counter-guarantee system, any change
made to the Community loan mechanism would be subject to a national parliamentary procedure.
This requirement would disappear if the dual guarantee were abolished.
Some members felt that a national parliamentary procedure was necessary in order to adopt the
changes made to the existing mechanism even if the system of counter-guarantees by the Member
States were abolished.25. 5. 81 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 124/19
3. The Committee feels that, whatever the guarantee system adopted, the contractual obligation for
servicing the debt devolves on the Community, as the institution issuing the loans.
Under the present dual-guarantee mechanism, the Community budget must, in the event of the debtor
Member State finding it impossible to meet its commitments, assure the payments attaching to the loans
out of its cash funds, until the refinancing mechanism is activated. The other Member States acquire a
claim on the Community, and this claim is extinguished at the latest when the borrowing Member State
has returned to solvency and can repay the instalments due.
If the counter-guarantee mechanism were abolished, the Community - still in the event of impossibility
for the debtor Member State to meet its commitment - would take responsibility for servicing the debt in
accordance with normal budgetary procedures (eg. supplementary or amending budget).
Irrespective of the guarantee system adopted, since the guarantee is represented by a token entry, the
corresponding liabilities are not taken into account in fixing the volume of expenditure of the Community
budget and in applying the own resources ceiling imposed by the limit of 1 % of the VAT rate.No C 124/20 Official Journal of the European Communities 25. 5. 81
ANNEX III
OPINION ON lHE SUBSTITUTION ACCOUNT
I. INTRODUCTION
1. A substitution account is a mechanism whereby a
country holding dollar claims may cede a part of them,
and receive claims denominated in SDR in return, while
the body which receives their deposits subsequently
becomes the creditor of the US, but longer-term.
2. At the IMF Interim Committee in October last in
Belgrade the President-in-Office of the Council, speaking
on behalf of the Community, stated that 'in principle the
Community was open to the idea of the setting up on a
voluntary basis of a substitution account and supported
the proposal that the Executive Board continue its study
into the detailed provisions required for its operation.
Since then, there has been a change in the conditions
under which the debate on, and setting up of, the
substitution account has to be seen, because of the
following new facts:
the increase in oil prices;
prospective increases in OPEC surpluses;
large fluctuations in the dollar, sometimes up,
sometimes down;
the emergence in most Community countries of
current account deficits which will have to be
financed;
increased need for recycling, both the industrialized
and developing countries;
big jumps in inflation rates,
consequences on interest rates.
without not
Whatever the importance of these factors, it 
indispensable for the future of the International
Monetary System to organize a better distribution of
reserve asset functions, and it is in this light that the idea
of creating a substitution account should be examined.
3. The Committee stresses the importance of four
basic principles which should govern the setting up of the
account:
participation must be voluntary, but as wide as
possible;
if the account is to perform a positive role in the
International Monetary System then it will have to be
on a sufficiently large scale;
the claims on the account must be both attractive and
easily negotiable
the financial balance of the account must be
fundamentally assured.
II. ASSESSMENT
4. The Committee has examined a number 
advantages which would attach to the creation of the
substitution account, but it points out that it will also
raise a number of problems. Any final overall assessment
will depend on the solutions, some technical, some
political, which are found to the separate issues relating
to the characteristics of the asset and the viability of the
account.
5. The substitution account:
(a) would help to channel the diversification of official
reserves in a non-disruptive way, i.e. outside the
exchange markets. It would contribute to the partial
funding of dollar reserves and also help to divert
pressures on EEC currencies to playa reserve role.
However, the liquidity of the SDR claims would have
to be properly ensured in order that the liquidity of
participating central banks would not be unduly
impaired;
(b) would be a step towards the better management of
international liquidity; on condition that this does
~ot expand excessively;
(c) could constitute a step towards making the SDR the
principal reserve asset in the system; however, to this
end, competition between the SDR proper and the
SDR claims would have to be avoided;
(d) could provide large reserve holders with an attractive
investment opportunity not subject to national
regulation offering a market-orientated yield, and a
reduced exchange risk, as long as satisfactory
solutions are found to the problems of possible
capital loss of the account, and of  possible
differential in interest received and interest paid by
the account.
6. The lasting pursuit of prudent economic policies
under the firm surveillance of the IMF, by all members
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the functioning of the system is an important
precondition for the satisfactory working of the
substitution account and for a possible reopening of the
account in future.
7. The Committee is of the OpInIOn that a
properly-functioning substitution account would
contribute towards a greater degree of international
stability which should provide for the smoother
functioning of the EMS. 'Furthermore, the existence of a
substitution account is not likely to impede the eventual
development of the ECU, nor reduce its usefulness.
m. UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS
8. The Committee draws attention to four maIn
problems on which negotiations may centre:
the need to make the claims sufficiently attractive;
the principle according to which guarantees of the
financial balance of the account should be shared
between the US and other participants;
the use of IMF gold;
the distribution of voting rights and other
institutional questions.
A.  Attractiveness
Liquidity of the proposed SDR-denominated asset is of
primary importance. The availability of the asset to
private holders should not be excluded, but this question
should be dealt with in the context of the further
development of SDR claims.
Rules will have to be devised for ensuring the
maintenance of the financial balance of the account.
To this end, the capital value should be calculated at
regular intervals, and appropriate solutions for meeting
any shortfall worked out. The financial balance of the
account could be ensured by appropriate recourse to the
range of potential assets of the account, including
previously accumulated surpluses, IMF gold, and by
guarantees provided by the United States and depositOrs.
A disequilibrium could also arise from interest shortfalls;
the Committee is of the opinion that while, as a general
principle, these shortfalls, unless covered by previous
surpluses in the account, should be covered by the United
States, this issue will have to be negotiated.
B.  Sharing of guarantees between the  US  and depositiors
Any guarantee would have to be fairly shared. The main
Issues are:
the size of and the priority to be accorded to the 
share;
the distribution of shares among the depositors,
which should be related to the size of their deposits
without special treatment for particular groups of
countries.
C.  I MF gold
There is widespread agreement that IMF gold will play
an important role in supporting the account. The method
by which the gold is to be made available (direct transfer
restitution or earmarking) and the precise methods by
which the gold would in practice support the account are
issues still to be decided.
Moreover, a majority of 85 % of the voting power within
the IMF is required for a decision to make gold available.
Thus the agreement of the developing countries will be
necessary. In this connection, it should be borne in mind
that the account should provide for a better functioning
of the International Monetary System and that therefore
recourse to gold in support of the account would benefit
all members of the IMF.
D.  Distribution of voting rights
This question is related to decisions on the legal structure
of the account. The Committee would expect that voting
rights of depositors would be related to the size of their
deposits. In any case, the distribution should grant an
appropriate position to the US.No C 124/22 Official Journal of the European Communities 25. 5. 81
ANNEX IV
lHE UK GREEN PAPER ON MONETARY CONTROL (1
Report of the Working Party
Harmonization of the monetary policy instruments
1. In May 1980 the Monetary Committee and the Committee of Governors invited the
Working Party on Harmonization of Monetary Policy Instruments to study the United
Kingdom s Green Paper on Monetary Control.
2. The ~Iorking Party has confined itself to considering the monetary control methods
detailed in chapters 4 and 5 of the Green Paper. These are briefly outlined in Chapter I of this
report. The effectiveness, costs and benefits of these methods from a domestic viewpoint are
studied on the basis of EEC member countries' experience in this area (see chapter II). The
compatibility of the monetary control methods with the objective of harmonizing monetary
policy instruments and their significance for the working of the EMS and for future
membership of the exchange rate mechanism by the United Kingdom are considered in
chapter III.
(1) Monetary control, Command 7858, presented to Parliament by the Chancellor of the Exchequer by
Command of Her Majesty, March 1980.
I. mE GREEN PAPER ON MONETARY CONTROL
3. The Green Paper on monetary control was
announced by the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
November 1979 and published on 20 March 1980. It is
part of a gradual strengthening of the monetary
authorities' control over monetary aggregates dating
back to 1976 when quantified monetary targets were
formulated for the first time. It also forms part of a
broader policy reassessment aiming at a reduction of the
rate of inflation and creation of conditions for a
sustainable growth of output and employment. Excessive
reliance on interest rates to achieve the monetary
expansion target has been ruled out, the government
viewing a substantial reduction over the medium-term in
the public sector borrowing requirement as a percentage
of nominal GDP as of major importance, together with
an appropriate funding policy.
4. Certain crucial propositions fundamental to
current thinking on monetary policy by the British
monetary authorities, are made in the Green Paper and
so are not open to discussion here:
- first, although no single statistical measure of money
supply can be expected fully to encapsulate monetary
conditions, the present practice of setting just one
target (for sterling M3) (1) is endorsed. Even so the
) Sterling M3 is defined as notes and coin in circulation with
the public, together with all sterling deposits (including
certificates of deposit) held by UK residents in both the
public and private sectors.
need for the monetary authorities to assess monetary
conditions having regard to a range of monetary
indicators is stressed;
secondly, the British authorities are satisfied that the
main instruments of monetary control - fiscal policy
and interest rates - remain sufficient to achieve
monetary objectives applied to periods of about one
year.
5. Three firm proposals for change are made in the
Green Paper. First, the direct control on banks' eligible
liabilities - the Supplementary Special Deposit Scheme or
corset
' - 
should be abandoned; this was done in June
1980. Secondly, the Reserve Assets Ratio (RAR) should
no longer be retained although the associated power to
call for Special Deposits will remain in order to guard
against possible adverse effects of excess liquidity in the
banking system as a whole. Thirdly, the present cash
r~quirement, which acts as a fulcrum for the Bank when
it wishes to generate interest rate changes, should be
extended to all banks rather than applying just to the
London clearing banks as at present. (Concurrently with
the Green Paper, the Bank of England also issued a
separate consultative document on the need for banks to
hold liquid assets for prudential purposes.
, 6. In addition, the Green Paper welcomes views on
two further proposals which would mainly serve the25. 5. 81 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 124/23
more limited purpose of seeking to improve monetary
control in the short term, at least from quarter to
quarter. This would be especially desirable if it led 
ensure calmer conditions in financial markets which are
at times very sensitive to unexpected short-term
deviations of monetary indicators. It might also reduce
any bias towards delay by monetary authorities reacting
to short-term deviations from target and strengthen
'Confidence in the authorities' resolve to achieve their
medium-term monetary objectives. The Green Paper
specifically avoids consideration of change to ,the range
of debt instruments offered by the Government or of
changes in their methods of operation in debt markets, as
these subjects were opened to debate last year.
7. The first proposed new method of monetary
control - a monetary base control system - seeks to
control the amount of base money (l) in existence and so
the total growth of the money supply. It assumes that
there is a stable relationship between monetary base and
the banks' balance sheets either because bankers
maintain such a relationship in the normal conduct of
their business or as a result of a mandatory reserve
requirement.
8. The second monetary control scheme (s an
indicator system. Under the indicator approach
(1) Base money includes bankers deposits at the central bank
and may also include notes and coin held by either or both
the banks and the public.
divergences from the desired path of the base or, even
more directly given the present target aggregate, of
sterling M3 itself, would trigger a predetermined
adjustment of the Bank's lending rate to the discount
market until such time as the target aggregate came back
into line.
9. The Green Paper sets two preconditions in
considering the various possible forms of monetary
control which would assist in bringing the growth path
of monetary aggregates in the short term under closer
control by the monetary authorities than at present:
the authorities consider that any new technique must
avoid providing a significant incentive to
disintermediation (it was precisely for this reason
that the UK authorities abandoned the 'corset' in
June 1980);
unless there was a high probability of assuring
improved monetary control in the short term there is
presumption against changes in methods of
monetary control that would require fundamental
institutional changes and/or which could be so
inconsistent with subsequent membership of the
exchange rate mechanism of the European Monetary
System that they would have to be changed again if
the Government decided that the conditions for
joining were appropriate.
II. ASSESSMENT OF THE COSTS, BENEFITS AND EFFECTIVENESS FOR THE UNITED
KINGDOM OF THE PROPOSED MONETARY CONTROL METHODS
10. The Green Paper suggests that there would 
advantage in shortening the period within which it was
possible to exercise monetary control, if there were
practicable ways of doing this, since excessive short-term
fluctuations may cause uncertainty about the
Government s resolve and its ability to control monetary
growth.
11. The group noted that preliminary econometric
studies submitted to it pointed to the conclusion that the
money stock in the United Kingdom might be no more
volatile in the short run than elsewhere. In the United
Kingdom s case, however, it has been argued that even
greater short-run monetary growth stability is needed to
improve the functioning of the long-term government
bond market by encouraging a steady reduction of
inflationary expectations which are a major determinant
of demand in this market. This is explained by the fact
that the financial markets have on occasions been
nervous of any hint that the monetary authorities might
for any reason be losing sight of a desirable monetary
objective. With the expectation that the monetary
aUthorities might have to raise interest rates considerably
because of the upward deviation from target, there has
usually been a sharp fall in market demand for
government debt, especially from institUtional investors,
reducing the bank of England's ability to offset excessive
monetary growth through gilt sales to the non-bank
sector and so intensifying expectations of higher interest
rates. As a result such a self-fulfilling prophecy of higher
interest rates stemming from a short-term deviation from
the official monetary growth path has required the
authorities to react sharply in order to convince the
market that interest rates were at their new peak.No C 124/24 Official Journal of the European Communities 25. 5. 81
1. Monetary base control
12. Provided there is a stable relationship between the
development of the monetary base and that of the target
variable, the authorities, by fixing the desired amount of
base money, are in theory able to obtain the desired
monetary growth rate, leaving the structure and the level
of interest rates to be determined by market forces.
Without considering the effectiveness of a monetary base
control system in the longer run and the usefulness of
monetary base as an indicator, the group felt that its
implementation as a short-term control instrument
involved sizable costs.
13. The nature of these costs can be seen when one
looks at the operational details of the various possible
schemes. The Green Paper rules out schemes without
mandatory reserve requirements, as in the British case
the banking system currently holds a variety of assets
that the authorities are prepared to convert into cash or
against which the authorities will lend cash.
Consequently, without major institutional changes, there
would be no prospect of a stable relationship between
the monetary base and the money stock. As far as
schemes with mandatory reserve requirements are
concerned, the group noted that with lagged accounting
(where current base requirements are fixed by reference
to deposits in a previous period) the demand for base
money will reflect monetary developments which have
already materialized. If the money stock has been rising
above the target (market determined demand exceeds the
central bank's desired supply) the central bank has three
choices. It can let the banks go below the reserve
requirement, or it can allow interest rates to rise, possibly
very sharply, leading to disorderly markets, or it can
provide the base demanded. To the extent that the
central bank is known to be unwilling to intervene, the
banks will tend to hold greater excess reserves and the
problem of imballance is likely to arise less frequently.
However, if the banks are willing to vary their level of
excess reserves, then the short run link between
monetary base and money stock is weaker. The group
noted that lagged accounting is the common practice of
most EEC central banks. However, reserve requirements
on a Ic,gged accounting basis are not used as an
imtrument for controlling monetary growth over short
periods but as a lever to bring about the desired money
market and lending rate changes.
14. A mandatory relationship between the monetary
base and deposits with lead accounting (where the
holding of base assets would put a limit on deposits at
me future date), together with penalties for both
under- and over-predicting, would be better suited for
monetary control over short periods. On the other hand,
such a scheme may present some serious difficulties, 
particular the risk of banks disintermediating or
reintermediating in order to ensure that banks' forecasts
of their future balance sheets were correct. Indeed, the
working party noted that in an overdraft system and
with considerable unused credit lines balance, sheets
projections were extremely unreliable, suggesting that
the risk of artificial adjustments of balance sheets by
banks would be considerable.
15. The group observed that the more rigidly
monetary authorities operate a monetary base control
system to control money stock in the short term, (i.e. the
more severe the penalties on individual banks or the
banking system as a whole) the stronger the incentive for
disintermediation or reintermediation. Nevertheless,
disintermediation could be less pronounced than under a
system of quantitative controls such as the ' corset' and
credit ceilings. Indeed, whereas credit ceilings are highly
selective in their application, allowing greater scope for
near substitution, the more generalized application of a
monetary base control system could ensure that banks
compete to secure base assets to match excess growth in
deposits rather than resorting to more complicated
disintermediation. The consequent increase in interest
rates will help to curb the excessive growth of the money
stock. The effect may, however, be limited since banks
may become aware of the high costs of this process and
would do their utmost to avoid aggressively bidding up
the interest rate on base assets and would disintermediate
further.
16. It may be argued that the attainment of the official
monetary objective is of paramount importance and that
disintermediation is an acceptable part of the process by
which the monetary objective may be met without
placing undue strains on the banking system. On the
other hand, there are two major drawbacks. First of all
to the extent that the financial markets are aware of the
existence of disintermediation, the confidence effect
sought by the authorities by smoothing out short-term
fluctuations in monetary growth will not come about.
Secondly, the effectiveness of monetary policy will 
weakened. Indeed, the final purpose of monetary policy
is not hitting a given target, but contributing to the
attainment of the final economic objectives. When
setting a given monetary target, the authorities assume
that attainment of this target will produce the desired
effects on the economy. These effects would not come
about if the authorities adhered to a target variable
which no longer accurately reflected monetary
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17. Some EEC central banks nevertheless operate
schemes which give an incentive to disintermediation;
this is, however, not for domestic manipulation of the
monetary aggregates but in order to meet a specific
economic objective. For example the ceiling on lira
denominated bank lending to Italian residents has the
effect of generating desired capital inflows. Elsewhere the
authorities benefit from the fact that credit markets are
relatively isolated from each other so that
disintermediation cannot easily take place.
18. Consideration, was given to whether the problem
of disintermediation or reintermediation could be
overcome by changing the definition of the target
variable so as to cover 'distintermediated' assets. This
could, however, give an incentive to develop new credit
channels which might be even less identifiable and
tolerable. An example, now that exchange controls have
been aboli:;hed in the United Kingdom, is the potential
permanent loss of bank business to the euro-markets.
19. The working party also discussed whether
disintermediation could be avoided or restricted by
making mandatory reserve requirements interest bearing.
It concluded that this would avoid discrimination against
conventional banking operations and so reduce the
incentive for banks to permanently switch their lending
operations into a non-controlled parallel market.
However it would not avoid disintermediation
whenever the monetary authorities sought in the
short-term to smooth out undesired movements in the
money stock by means of monetary base control.
20. The group noted that besides these fundamental
problems the operation of a monetary base control
system is also made difficult by unpredictable swings in
cash flows. It pointed out that most EEC central banks
express the cash requirements in terms of an average over
a period. This would not, however, entirely resolve the
problem of unpredictable movements in cash flows, but
only concentrate the problem on some critical days at the
end of the reference period. These problems are, of
course, of minor importance in these EEC countries
because no attempt is made to control the level of the
monetary base over short periods.
2. Indicator system
21. The attractiveness of an indicator system with a
predetermined scale for interest rate changes is seen by its
proponents as an attempt do devise a system in which the
authorities would respond more quickly to changes in
the underlying trend of sterling M3 rather than reduce
directly its month-to-month variability. Therefore, unless
the authorities avail themselves very frequently of the
power to override automatic interest rate changes, any
bias towards delay of action by the monetary authorities
would no longer exist. This would prevent extensive
periods of monetary growth in excess of the target range
without corrective action being taken. The proponents of
such a scheme further claim that the necessary interest
rate changes could be smaller and this could also reduce
the volatility in the growth of the money stock.
22. However, the group doubted whether all these
desired effects would actually come about. Firstly, the
indicator system would not alter the fact that changes in
bank lending rates will only affect borrowing, and hence
the money supply, with a lag. The size and timing of
borrowers' reactions to changes in loan rates in the
United Kingdom is unclear and some uncertainty
therefore attaches to the use of indicator systems to
control the money supply. In this regard an indicator
system might not contribute to greater control over the
short-term growth path of the money stock.
23. Secondly, while it is claimed that an indicator
system would make sales of government debt easier
there are some doubts whether the interest rate
adjustments taken according to a predetermined scale
could convince the financial markets that interest rates
have reached their peak or trough. If the markets were
not convinced, they would remain in a state of tension
and the deviations of monetary growth from the desired
growth path might even be accentuated. In order to
avoid such a perverse effect it would be essential that the
authorities maintain the power to react, if necessary by
drastic measures, in order to correct the situation. This,
in fact, is the present system by which a refusal by the
market to buy gilts at the prevailing price is usually met
by a sharp rise in official interest rates followed by clear
signs from the monetary authorities that a new peak has
been reached and rates would then stabilize or even fall.
24. In consequence, there is no assurance that an
indicator system would lead to less volatility in interest
rates and monetary growth. In addition, frequent interest
rate changes might have an effect on monetary growth
not only in the short-term but also over longer periods.
Thus despite the monetary authorities declared
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frequent short-term interventions might interfere with
medium-term control.
25. Some members of the group felt that nevertheless
it might be worthwhile considering to what extent the
present discretionary scheme could be adjusted so as to
reduce any bias toward delay in taking monetary action.
In the case of the United Kingdom this might take the
form of liquidity facilities of the central bank becoming
less easily accessible to the banking system (via the
discount houses). This would allow a more aggressive
money market policy to bring interest rates to the desired
level before formal measures such as discount rate
changes are taken. It would involve, however, major
institutional changes whereas the indicator system claims
the advantage of involving very limited institutional
changes.
1lI. THE POSSIBLE CHANGES IN MONETARY CONTROL METHODS FROM A COMMUNITY
VIEWPOINT
26. The Working Party examined from two angles
and from a Community point of view the possible
changes in the techniques of monetary control presented
in the Green Paper:
the harmonization of monetary policy instruments
within the Community;
the consistency with the functioning of the EMS and
with participation in the exchange rate mechanism.
1. Harmonization of monetary policy instruments
27. The Working Party s mandate requests it to study
the instruments which are required by each Member
State for its monetary policy and to examine their
possible degree of harmonization with reference to
Article 9 of Council Directive 74/121/EEC of 
February 1974 on stability, growth and full employment
in the Community. In this respect, the proposed or
possible changes in the present system of monetary
control, as presented in the consultation paper, would
not seem to run counter to this Community provision. In
fact, the Green Paper s concern with ensuring a rapid
response of the authorities to apparent deviations from
target appears to be in agreement with the Article
requirement that Member States be able ' to take prompt
action orl the various elements covered by the policy of
the monetary authorities
28. The relevance of the Directive, with its approach
of favouring 'fine-tuning' and short-term efficiency
criteria, could however be questioned, since the emphasis
of monetary policy, as mentioned in the group s last
report (Report on certain questions relating to monetary
policy instruments dated 29 May 1979), has
progressively become oriented to ensure more moderate
and steadier growth in money supply over longer
periods. In the United Kingdom this has been carried to
the point of the publication by the Government of a
quantified medium-term financial strategy which has as
its main objective a progressive reduction in the annual
rate of money supply growth to about 6 % in the
financial year to April 1984.
29. Nevertheless, the ideas in the Green Paper would
seem to accord with a general trend apparent in the
Community over recent years, particularly in the major
countries. The adherence to norms for a steady and
moderate expansion of the monetary aggregates
designed to stabilize expectations and reduce the rate of
inflation has been accompanied by  less,
accommodating or a more aggressive stance in the
management of monetary policy while the authorities
have accepted relatively sharp movements in short-term
interest rates.
30. However, there would appear to be important
differences with regard to the specific aims and methods
outlined in the Green Paper. In the first place, few EEC
countries pursue their monetary intermediate objectives
by exclusive reliance on the control of money market
conditions; most employ a mix of direct and indirect
instruments, i.e. of instruments which act throu~
administrative measures and those acting through price
and market mechanisms, and in many countries the
former have often prevailed over the latter. For several
countries, the control of money market conditions is
dictated essentially by external considerations and
cannot be relied upon to achieve the intermediate
monetary objective (money stock or credit target). The
need to keep a free hand with respect to interest rate
policy has induced some smaller open economies to
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31. Furthermore, it should be observed that even
those larger countries which can afford to gear their
day-to-day monetary management almost exclusively to
the attainment of their monetary target apply methods
which are more flexible than those described in Chapters
4 and 5 of the Green Paper. There is in particular no aim
to achieve smooth trajectories consistent with the
authorities' annual projections for the target variable: a
process of strict adherence to the target path is seen to
require such large and erratic variations in market
interest rates as to have insettling and undesirable effects
on the real economy and on the public s price and
exchange rate expectations. In sum, the authorities have
generally maintained a certain degree of operational
flexibility and have accepted short-run or random
departures from the target path to take account of shifts
in money demand and/or the desire to smooth out
exchange rate movements.
32. While in certain respects the formulae presented
in the Green Paper might be seen as being part of a
general trend within the Community, in other respects
they depart from current practices. The Working Party is
nevertheless of the opinion that this is not in itself of
major significance as the harmonization of monetary
policy instruments is not a central issue in the present
phase of Community integration. In this regard it recalls
the conclusion of its second report (Doc. 11/458/78),
which claims that harmonization of monetary policy
instruments or even intermediate objectives is difficult to
attain in present circumstances and is a longer term goal
that might be harmful to economies if implemented at
present. Pending further progress towards economic and
monetary union, it recommends coordination as an
essential element to improve understanding and to
prepare for final harmonization. From this point of view,
the question 9f the consistency of the possible changes in
the methods of monetary control with the functioning
and the future membership of the EMS exchange rate
mechanism acquires particular relevance.
2. Consistency of the possible changes in monetary
control methods with the functioning of the EMS
and participation in the exchange rate mechanism
33. The consistency with the EMS of the monetary
control methods outlined in the Green Paper may be
examined from two perspectives:
whether the monetary control methods pursued to
bring down the rate of inflation while the UK is not a
full member of the system could raise problems for
its smooth functioning; and
whether they are compatible with and take sufficient
account of p~sible future membership.
34. Exchange rate expectations and interest rate levels
are the joint determinants of external capital flows. If
exchange rate expectations, are particularly sensitive to
any deviation in the money stock from the authorities
target, the successful smoothing of the money stOck
growth rate within the target range would stabilize
exchange rate expectations and so lessen the risk of
erratic capital flows.
35. The group noted, however, that in certain
circumstances there are still other factors than the
monetary authorities' success in keeping money stock
growth on target which determine exchange rate
expectations and so overshooting of the money stock
target in the short term might not necessarily undermine
exchange rate confidence. In such circumstances the
interest rate effects of the monetary base control and
indicator systems might lead to undesired, erratic capital
flows.
36. It may be argued that in a  monetary base control
system  only very short term and largely technical interest
rates are affected. Fluctuations in these very short-term
interest rates might not be sufficient to generate sizable
capital flows. Interest rates for longer-term periods (for
example the three-month rate) might become even less
volatile than at present if confidence in the monetary
authorities' short-term smoothing operation is great or if
as a result of the policies adopted smoother monetary
growth is in fact secured with less sharp changes in
interest rates. However, the group was not sure whether
the effects would necessarily be confined to fluctuations
in very short and largely technical interest rates. Even if
they were, there might be situations on the exchange
markets in which even fluctuations in these very short
and technical interest rates might generate sizable capital
flows. All these conclusions are, however largely
speculative given the lack of empirical experience in the
whole field of short-term monetary base control.
37. The likely effect on the exchange rate and capital
flows of disintermediation/reintermediation caused by a
monetary base control system could be broadly neutral
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problems of timing which could cause exchange rate
instability. The most likely form would be for banks
situated in the United Kingdom and subject to the
control to divert sterling deposits to offshore branches
not subject to control. But since these offshore deposits
would then probably be on-lent in sterling for use in the
United Kingdom there would be exactly offsetting capital
outflows and inflows with no net change in the demand
for sterling. Schemes which present a strong incentive for
disintermediation/reintermediation would thus create no
major external problem but are not acceptable to the
United Kingdom authorities for domestic reasons.
38. In an  indicator system  where the Bank of
England' official rates were changed automatically
much would depend on whether the size of interest rate
changes which were necessary to control monetary
growth would be smaller or greater than at present.
39. As long as the United Kingdom is not a full
member of the EMS, the implementation of one or other
of the control methods described in the Green Paper need
not raise major problems for the smooth functioning of
the EMS. However, greater exchange rate variability
between the EMS currencies and the pound sterling
would have harmful economic consequences for some
smaller EMS countries with close economic and financial
links with the United Kingdom. Further problems could
arise if induced capital flows had an uneven impact on
members of the EMS exchange rate mechanism. On the
other hand, if the various control methods helped the
British authorities to improve monetary control and this
helped to bring down the rate of inflation - the latter
being one of the major obstacles to UK membership of
the exchange rate meachnism -, this would facilitate the
United Kingdom s participation in this mechanism.
40. Considering whether the approach outlined in the
Green Paper is compatible with and takes sufficient
account of possible participation in the exchange rate
mechanism of the EMS, the working party observed that
since the EMS is a fixed but adjustable exchange rate
system it is generally possible - as the policies of some of
the larger members of the EMS indicate - to maintain the
money supply as an intermediate objective and also to
adopt an exchange rate commitment; but the temporal
horizons of the two normally differ. Since the exchange
rate commitment is absolutely binding in the short term
too frequent realignments being ruled out 
inconsistent with the concept of the EMS - all
participants have faced the necessity - at least for a short
period - of accepting some deviation of their money
stock growth rates from target because of external
capital flows, including inflows from non-participants.
Even so, over longer periods the money stock target may
still be broadly attained once the generally short-lived
exchange rate pressures have eased, or the parity 
adjusted.
41. In consequence, the group noted that, depending
on circumstances the potential conflict between
exchange rate commitments and money supply
objectives could become more acute if the authorities
attempt - as the Green Paper suggests - to control even
short-term fluctuations in monetary growth. The fact
that both an exchange rate and a monetary target involve
staying within a range, rather than achieving a precise
figure, would mitigate the risk of conflict only to a minor
extent. Faced with pressures in the foreign exchange
markets, central banks have had some success in
sterilizing capital inflows through the banking system
but sterilization of inflows through the non-bank sector
is much more difficult.
42. In the case of actual participation of the United
Kingdom in the EMS, the possible interest rate volatility
of the monetary base control and indicator systems could
seriously disturb the equilibrium within the exchange
rate mechanism even if monetary intermediate objectives
were consistent with each other in the longer run. On the
other hand, as long as the methods are applied to a
monetary rather than a domestic credit aggregate, it
would be difficult to adapt only marginally the formulae
to take account of the requirements of the exchange rate
mechanism. For example, if in an indicator system the
authorities used their power to override automatic
interest rate changes because of the position of their
currency within the EMS margins or in a monetary base
control system they entirely or partly made allowance for
that part of monetary base which is created or destroyed
by foreign exchange purchases or sales by the central
bank, this would run counter to the basic theoretical
approach of the proponents of monetary control over
short periods.
43. A final consideration is the cost of reversing some
of the possible changes in the methods of monetary
control if they were seen to be inconsistent with
membership of the EMS exchange rate mechanism at the
moment of joining. From this point of view, an indicator
system based on the money supply would not necessarily
involve significant changes in the financial system, so
that it could probably be reversed at little cost if this were
deemed necessary; this is clearly an important advantage
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CONCLUSIONS
44. The Green Paper discusses two methods for
improving short-term monetary control in the United
Kingdom, i.e. a monetary base control system and an
indicator system. The two proposals are briefly described
in paragraphs 7 and 8 above.
45. There are some indications that from a domestic
point of view monetary base control aimed at very
short-term control of the money stock could either put
severe strains on the British banking system or, if it
created an incentive for disintermediation, impair the
authorities ability to set and achieve appropriate
monetary targets in the medium run.
46. Although the group had some doubts whether an
indicator system would actually have the desired effects
claimed by its proponents, and felt that it might even
have undesirable effects in certain circumstances, 
acknowledged that such a system - unlike a monetary
base control system - could be implemented without
involving major institutional changes.
47. The group felt that it might be possible to reassure
financial markets that the present system of discretionary
adjustments of official rates need not necessarily imply a
bias towards delay of action by the monetary authorities.
The reassurance of financial markets could be enhanced
if the monetary authorities also found better ways of
communicating to the markets their resolve and ability to
meet their medium-term monetary objectives, convincing
the markets that short-term fluctuations in monetary
growth are acceptable or even inevitable. In this
connection the working group noted that according to
preliminary econometric studies the money stock in the
United Kingdom appears to be no more volatile in the
short run than elsewhere. Consequently markets may
gradually become less sensitive to short-term deviations of monetary growth as they progressively gain
confidence in a rapid return to the desired path., There is
some evidence for this in the experience of both the
United Kingdom and other EEC countries. Furthermore,
it noted that the scope for changes to the range of debt
instruments offered by the Government or to their
methods of operation .in debt markets was already
opened to debate in the United Kingdom last year.
48. From a Community point of view the group noted
in particular some possible drawbacks for the
functioning of the EMS but felt that there would be no
major impediment to the smooth functioning of the
system if any of the various control methods were
applied while the United Kingdom still was not 
member of the exchange rate mechanism.
49. Once the United Kingdom became a member of
the mechanism the potential conflict in the system
between exchange rate commitments and monetary
objectives would be accentuated in particular by the
monetary base control method if it is used to attempt
short-term control of the money stock and if such
short-term control does not have a positive effect on
expectations. Indeed, in a fixed but adjustable exchange
rate mechanism, the monetary authorities of a country
can only be sure of achieving their monetary targets over
longer periods (i.e. periods of a year or more), and
short-term deviations from the target path have to be
accepted on occasions. The aim by a major country to
smooth short-term fluctuations in monetary growth
. could, in the extreme, imply the need for more frequent
and erratic central rate alignments than would be
desirable for the smooth functioning of the EMS
exchange rate mechanism.
50. The group concluded that there remained
considerable doubts as to whether the monetary control
methods outlined in Chapters 4 and 5 of the Green Paper
would, on balance, be advantageous either for the United
Kingdom or for the Community as a whole.